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Disarmament: How and When?

Moderator, JAMES MURRAY, JR.

Speakers

RONALD MACKAY

JOSEPH JOHNSON

RALPH FLANDERS



COMING

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or Destruction?**

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The account of the meeting reported in this Bulletin was transcribed from recordings made of the actual broadcast and represents the exact content of the meeting as nearly as such mechanism permits. The publishers and printer are not responsible for the statements of the speakers or the points of views presented.

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

SENATOR RALPH FLANDERS—Republican of Vermont; Author of Senate Resolution on Disarmament; member of Armed Services Committee. Senator Ralph Flanders was born in 1880 in Vermont, and attended school in Rhode Island. Unable to enter college because of insufficient funds, Senator Flanders became an apprentice to a manufacturing company in Providence. At 22, while a draftsman, he began the study of engineering with a correspondence school. In 1905 the Senator went to New York to become associate editor of a journal for the machinery industry. He returned to Vermont in 1912, and soon became director and manager of the Jones and Lamson Machine Company.

The appointment Senator Flanders considers his most important one came to him in 1933. This was the appointment by Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper to his Department's Business Advisory and Planning Council. Described as perhaps the most outspoken opponent of New Deal policies on the council, Flanders became its vice-chairman and spokesman on unemployment at the White House.

In 1944, after serving with the War Production Board, Flanders accepted a position as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Two years later he was named temporary president of the American Research and Development Corporation, formed to provide capital for new products and enterprises. That same year Ralph Flanders was asked by Governor Proctor to fill the unexpired term of Senator Warren Austin, and was selected in the general election after winning the Republican primary. He was appointed to the Senate committee on Banking and Currency. Senator Flanders is chairman of Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, and vice chairman of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Senator Flanders has been reelected to the Senate for a six year term (1952).

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON—President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Born in Longdale, Virginia in 1906, and educated at Harvard (S.B. 1927), Mr. Johnson began his career as a history instructor at Bowdoin and Williams Colleges. He was named Assistant Professor of History at Williams

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Disarmament: How and When?

Announcer:

Town Meeting tonight is broadcast from the auditorium of the new Carnegie Endowment International Center, just across from the United Nations at 46th Street. The International Center was constructed to offer a variety of conference and meeting rooms for programs on world affairs and to provide space for administrative offices of non-profit organizations concerned with international peace and well-being. Their opportunities for service will increase by their proximity to each other and to the UN. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of many organizations founded by Andrew Carnegie, was established in 1910. To quote Mr. Carnegie, the purpose is "to hasten the abolition of war, the foulest blot upon our civilization."

The Carnegie Endowment publishes books, pamphlets, and a periodical called *International Conciliation* to increase the understanding of international problems. It also conducts a study in 20 countries of their national policies and attitudes toward the United Nations, looking forward to charter revision in 1955, and encourages college and university programs related to world affairs. Now to preside as moderator for tonight's discussion here is James F. Murray Jr., New York attorney, international counsel and lecturer. Mr. Murray. (Applause)

Moderator Murray:

Few concepts of modern diplomacy have attracted such universal support, and yet at the same time engendered so many seemingly insuperable problems, as the proposal of peace through disarmament. Although debated and briefly exper-

imented upon after the First World War, only Hiroshima and the atomic bomb gave sharp focus to the fact that the ultimate alternative to disarmament might well be weapons of destruction so lethal as to threaten the obliteration of life itself on our planet. Reacting to world opinion, the United Nations has addressed itself to the disarmament problem since 1946, but unfortunately with five years of acrimony, suspicion, and stalemate as the result, the grim background developed into one of unprecedented peacetime rearming and open warfare in Korea.

Then on April 16, President Eisenhower offered a five-point disarmament program and dramatically committed the United States to the principle of sharing the diverted savings on armaments. "The cost of one heavy bomber," the President said, "could provide thirty new schools; the price of one fighter plane could purchase one-half million bushels of wheat; the expense of one destroyer could construct modern homes for eight thousand people." As public interest mounted in the United States and over the world, Senator Ralph E. Flanders, who is with us tonight, submitted a bi-partisan resolution for guaranteed disarmament.

One week ago tonight, Adlai Stevenson urged that we resume the initiative in re-exploring the possibilities of disarmament. Two days later, Secretary of State Dulles affirmed in the United Nations that America is prepared to dedicate itself with renewed vigor to the task of disarmament. Only yesterday the Soviet delegate, Andrei Vishinsky, assailed Mr. Dulles and offered instead a Kremlin plan which with

slight variations was twice before presented to the Assembly.

Now despite the bitterness and frustration of diplomatic maneuver, many feel that a broad area of common ground does exist and that there is room for sincere difference of opinion as to the methods and timing required for a realistic disarmament program. Tonight, Town Hall presents three points of view in this most timely debate which originates in the new International Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, located just across the street from the United Nations.

Our first speaker is the distinguished Republican Senator from Vermont, the author of the Senate resolution on disarmament, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and Vice-Chairman of the joint committee on the Economic Report, Senator Ralph Flanders. (*Applause*)

Senator Flanders:

Mr. Moderator, you do me undue honor in making me Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. There are two men senior to me, either of whom I would sorrow greatly to see removed from the role of the Senate, so I am merely a member of the Armed Services Committee. Now the subject of this program is: "Disarmament: How and When?" I would like to add one word to the title, making it, Disarmament: How, When, and Whether? For it seems to me the real thing we have to realize is that disarmament has become a *must*. So the question of *whether* must be answered by a firm decision on the part of the people of the United States and the people of the world that total disarmament must be accomplished.

This necessity arises from the existence of the atomic and hydro-

gen bombs in the hands of the two greatest nations of the world, greatest, that is, in area and natural resources. The first thing we have to realize about this is that neither the American people nor the Russian people can by any possibility protect themselves against an all-out atomic attack. There is no sure safety.

We can minimize the number of bombs which would get through by expenditures which would approximate the cost of carrying on an old-fashioned world war. The Russian people can similarly strive to protect themselves by increasing their sacrifices in food, clothing and shelter for an indefinite time, but the Soviet bombs can get through to us; ours can get through to Russia. Knowing this and, more important, realizing this, it becomes a necessity for the people of Russia and the people of the United States to accept the guaranteed universal disarmament which includes the atomic and hydrogen bombs.

But this agreement must do more. It must relate to the conventional methods of warfare as well. Warfare can only be ended by ending the means by which it is carried on. If we once begin world war again, the temptation to try to end it by the atomic bomb will be even greater than it was in the closing days of our war with Japan.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Senator Flanders, and my apologies for your premature appointment. Our next speaker, Mr. Ronald W. MacKay, is a former British Labor Member of Parliament, member of the British delegation to the Council of Europe, author and lecturer. His varied career has included the appointment to the British National Council of European Movements.

or which he held a vice-chairmanship, and he was also a member of the British group of European Parliamentary Union. Re-elected to parliament in 1950, Mr. Mackay has lectured throughout the world. It is a great pleasure to present him to you tonight. Mr. Mackay. (Applause)

Mr. Mackay:

Mr. Moderator, I would like at the outset to pay tribute to the distinguished Senator from Vermont for the work which he has done in this whole problem of disarmament and the discussion of the question. I want to put forth a slightly different point of view. Disarmament is not new in the world. The reason for it since 1945 is because we have learned the lesson that we didn't learn before 1939, that if Britain and France and the United States had rearmed, then perhaps there needn't have been any Second World War at all.

And it is because of that sober fact that many liberal minded people today are beginning to realize that you have got to take steps to resist aggression, and, therefore, you have got to have arms for the purpose. Would you in this country dissolve the FBI, or would you dissolve the police forces of your individual states unless you were quite certain that there was going to be no crime and no breaches of the peace? Until you can be certain of that, you are in no position to dissolve them, nor are you in a position to dissolve the forces of the world or of your own country.

In other words, what I want to tell you is that the answer to the question we have got to consider tonight, as to the how and when of disarmament, is when we can remove the conditions that

make it necessary. Now shortly I want to put two conditions. The first is that so long as national states exist, and some of them are great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union because they are the only two that exist in the world today, there will be some of them who wish to maintain their position in the world by armed strength.

The states of the United States do not re-arm because they are parts of a federation and defense is a matter for the Union and not for any one of the forty-eight states. Collective security for the states of the United States is no problem because you've got government in the United States. Now that is the first consideration. The second is that you've got to think of the economic and social problems that create wars. There are colonial wars in Asia, in Africa; there are wars in the Middle East and in other parts of the world where people are struggling to gain their freedom, and the people in those parts of the world are going to go on fighting to get their freedom.

In other words, the world is in a continual state of civil war arising out of its political and social conditions and the desire for freedom. May I remind you that the solution to this problem really is to be drawn from the lessons of your own history? The differences of the North and South in America, nearly a hundred years ago, over all sorts of problems including slavery, were not resolved without force, and now you've got a strong government in this country which means that the people in the West and the people in the East do not fight one another.

Surely that is the lesson we've got to learn, that so long as there are independent sovereign states in the world, so long will there be

rearmament. To stop it, you must extend the area of democratic government in as many continents of the world as you can until you are in a position to get a world government. In short, I suggest to you that the step to secure disarmament is to extend the area of government as far as you can. I think the world is divided between two competing ideas, which may not come to conflict, but at any rate which cannot agree on a democratic form of government.

The step to take is to get Europe united in a federation with Britain in it, and then to bring in the United States. Get the democratic countries to form a government, extend the boundaries of the United States if you like, and get as many people as you can who think alike in political questions where there is the highest common factor of agreement in democracy. Get them together in, not an association of nations, which is only, after all, a call to action, but in a real government, in which there is power, which has been done in North America in the United States. I know this is a long way off, but I do suggest to you, and I speak as one who has known what has gone on in the twenty years between the wars and the disarmament efforts, that the only way you get disarmament is by getting government. That is the problem you've got to solve. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Mr. Mackay. Our final guest this evening is Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Johnson has had a long career in government and in teaching. Mr. Johnson was the Chief of the State Department Division of International Security Affairs from 1945 until 1947. While there he

was the United States adviser to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and to the Inter-American Conference on problems of war and peace in Mexico. He worked actively, as well, with the United Nations from its inception, and later he played an advisory role at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, at the first session of the General Assembly as well as many other meetings of the Security Council. It is a great pleasure to welcome this evening, Mr. Joseph E. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson:

Thank you, Mr. Moderator. If anyone ever had any doubts about the importance of disarmament, or as I prefer to call it—regulation of armaments—and as the Charter also calls it, these must have been dispelled by the recent stark statement of Secretary Dulles. I quote: "Physical scientists have now found means which, if they are developed, can wipe life off the surface of this planet." The destructive potentialities of atomic weapons are so great that the atom has become one of the principal political facts of our time.

Nevertheless, peace and security cannot be found by focusing on disarmament. True disarmament seems unrealistic, short of true world government, and we are still a very long way from that: I suggest that our principal concern is not really armaments as such. Apart from the stupendous cost, the real source of our concern is the danger from an aggressive Soviet Union possessing all the weapons of mass destruction. Apparently it will soon be possible, if it is not already so, for the two Leviathans, the United States and the Soviet Union, to attack each other with devastating effect.

The hard core of the disarmament problem is therefore a mat-

er of Soviet-American relations. This suggests that the most hopeful approach to disarmament *now* is not primarily through debate in the United Nations, where the United States has through the years since 1946 made abundantly clear our willingness, even our eagerness, for regulation of atomic and all other armaments with effective safeguards. The approach must be thought of in terms of communication with the Kremlin, and this will almost certainly have to involve discussion of other issues, such, for example, as the future of Germany. We must try to learn more about the way in which the Soviet rulers think of disarmament.

Are they, for example, as worried at the very thought of an atomic war as we are? If they are not, can we educate them? How?

I am now suggesting only an attempt at communication which must precede negotiations. Even communication will not be easy. It will indeed be so difficult that I cannot suggest when real negotiation leading to effective regulation of armaments might come, but this approach, it seems to me, may be possible and I think it the only approach which is. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray: There, ladies and gentlemen, you have the broad delineation of the positions of our three guests tonight. If I may, gentlemen, it occurs to me at the outset that we have a very fundamental difference of opinion among you. Recalling your opening statements, it is clear first of all that Senator Flanders prefers that disarmament be approached through the United Nations. Mr. Mackay feels that we must extend the area of democratic government and he favors the kind of movement toward federation, whereas Mr. Johnson has indicated that, in his opinion, the approach must be

thought of in terms of communication with the Kremlin. Now on that divergence of opinion, perhaps you gentlemen would like to comment, one upon the other.

Senator Flanders: The points of view, the difference in the points of view of the three of us, Mr. Murray, you have very well expressed. Let me say first with regard to world government as the requirement for disarmament, I have been accustomed to think of that in reverse terms, as a certain degree of world government being the result of disarmament, rather than the requirement for it.

I have had no enthusiasm about the endeavors to build up a world constitution and get the various nations to be signatories to it, but once the seriousness, the appalling seriousness, of the armament problem is realized, then we can perhaps set to work on the problem of devising the kind and degree of world government that is necessary to implement it—that is the word we use in Washington—I don't know what it means to implement disarmament. That will be an *ad hoc* approach, which I think is the only possible approach to a world government. Just one other word with regard to dealing with our friends in the Kremlin, my strong feeling is that we will have to "condition" them through the people over whom they rule.

The first approach is not to sit down with whomsoever at the time may represent the Soviet Government. We should be willing to do that at all times and under all conditions provided the discussion is on disarmament, but we should first make our appeal to the Russian people, telling them that they have nothing that we want, we don't want an acre of their territory or a dollar's worth of their resources, but that we are both

concerned in the immense amount of labor and resources that we are turning into armament and that we have a common cause. That is our approach to the problem of dealing with the Soviet Government.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Mackay, would you care to add something?

Mr. Mackay: I would just like to say two things. I really don't think this question of approach to the Soviet Union is really realistic unless you are going to create conditions in the world under which they are going to be satisfied that they are not the subject of a take. Obviously, I don't take the view that any of the Western powers want to attack the Soviet Union, but the Russian people think that. You can say they think that because they are conditioned, to use the Senator's word, by propaganda in the *Pravda* and other Russian papers. That may be true, but the fact is that if you talk to Russian statesmen, if you talk to Russian people, you get the impression quite clearly that they feel they are being circumscribed.

Now you see I take a very realistic view of this from this point of view. The world's history has been one long struggle for power—one long struggle. The Dutch, the Italians, the Spanish, the French, the British have all struggled and used force to acquire their position in the world, and now the Soviet Union and the United States are in a similar sort of position. Whether they are going to struggle against each other for power, I don't know, but it is perfectly obvious that the Russians have struggled for power since World War II ended and have acquired in different ways a very great deal of additional power. Now how do you oppose it?

Mr. Murray: Mr. Johnson?

Mr. Mackay: May I finish the point? How do you oppose it? How do you oppose this question of power? You do it by getting great strength. The only way you will make the Soviet disarm is to have so much strength in the Western powers that the Soviet will realize that war doesn't pay. We are a long way from doing that and that is why I say extend the area of government over the Western Europeans and America to get the strongest democratic entity in the world. Today we are all divided in the West, divided between Britain and America over Asia and China, completely divided, because there is no political authority to represent the West. Until you do that, you will never get strength.

Mr. Johnson: Mr. Moderator, I should like to suggest that all of us here would regard ourselves as realists, I think, Mr. Mackay. I am sure that I do, and I believe Senator Flanders does also. I would like to elaborate a little bit on my point about the United Nations. We have had discussions in the United Nations beginning in June of 1946. There has been developed a plan which all of the countries except the Soviet Union and its supporters have accepted and agreed to put into force as soon as may be.

Since 1947, no steps have been taken beyond that plan, which is now the United Nations plan for disarmament in the atomic field, and very few steps have been taken in the field of the regulation of so-called conventional armaments. That, sir, is not a Washington phrase; that is a New York United Nations phrase. The thing that I notice in considering the record of our relations to our discussions in the United Nations is that there has

not been really any communication between the Soviet Union and the rest of us on the subject of arms control. We have talked *at* each other; we have not talked *to* each other.

My proposal is, my belief is, that we talk *to* each other more privately than we do in the open halls of the United Nations. I would not for one moment retreat from anything that has been done in the United Nations; don't mistake me on that. I would not for one moment suggest that the United Nations must not come into the picture, but I am suggesting the necessity of some kind of private talks, which I hope that I don't know about and I hope that none of us know about at the time they take place, which will indicate more clearly what the Soviet Union does in fact have in mind with respect to this subject.

Mr. Murray: Senator Flanders.

Senator Flanders: Mr. Moderator, I can agree with Mr. Johnson to this extent, that I am not at all sure that further orations addressed against each other in the United Nations will be productive of results. I would feel that it may be very useful to talk privately as he has suggested, but may I suggest another firm belief of mine to which I have come? The great results of the future are going to be from peoples communicating with peoples, and it is for that reason that I believe a major part of our undertaking must be getting into communication with the Russian people themselves, and I am sure that that can be done.

You can get a one-minute break in the jamming now and then, and the thing to do is to keep the phonograph record going 24 hours a day. These Russians sit

up late and go to bed late and they are on the air when we are not, and people to people will be the answer, to my mind, to this matter of convincing the rulers of the world that disarmament is necessary and can be accomplished.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, regardless of the avenues which you feel should be employed, do you think that agreement on disarmament is possible *before* agreement on the outstanding political problems which afflict the world, such as Germany and China and Korea? Mr. Johnson?

Mr. Johnson: I would say very definitely no. It seems to me that the best one can hope for is concurrent agreement. I believe that was the phrase that Mr. Dulles used the other day. It is possible that there might be agreement on some aspects of disarmament simultaneously with agreement, for instance, on the problem of Germany. I think the talk about disarmament without considering the problem of Germany would be as unrealistic for us as a public as it would be for our diplomats in the United Nations or elsewhere.

Mr. Murray: Senator Flanders?

Senator Flanders: May I suggest that Mr. Johnson's *no* means never. Because there will never come a time when we settle the questions at issue between ourselves and the Soviet Government until they and we have completely changed our fundamental ideas, and I hope to God we never do. But, this matter of settling everything else before we approach with hope and wisdom this question of disarmament seems to me to put the cart before the horse.

You may have a different kind of vehicle than I do, but the cart before the horse for me means the possibility of settling all our world problems in an atmosphere of lay-

ing aside the use of force. That is a new thing. It has never been done and it will never be done except by the pressure of peoples and through the resistance of governments.

Mr. Mackay: I rather share Mr. Johnson's view as to the *no*, and I don't agree about the *never*. But I do ask people to really seriously consider the fact that so long as nations have differences they are not going to give up the power which they have in order to maintain their own point of view. That is the problem you have—national states, national sovereignty.

The exercise of the weapons of war is an exercise of sovereignty, and unless you are going to solve the political problems between nations, and I gave the example: The states of America fought one another over a principle; they used arms, and they didn't give them up until the war was over. Now you've got a common government, and so you don't fight within the forty-eight states, nor do people fight in Canada, nor do people fight in Australia, because there is a common government. There are no differences between those states which can't be resolved by the federal government of the place.

Now there are so many problems in the world. Germany is one; the Dardanelles is another; perhaps the Panama Canal is another; perhaps Suez is another; perhaps Korea and China are others. There are dozens of them, and you think that these people who are only just awakening, take all the awakening peoples of the Middle East and China and Africa who are just beginning to realize their power (We in the past have used force in order to acquire our position in the world.), and you

think they are going to give it up? It is not only the Soviet Union.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, each week we invite our listeners to submit a question which they would like to hear the speakers discuss on the air. This week Mr. and Mrs. James D. Olson of Clearwater, Florida, will receive a complete 20-volume set of the American People's Encyclopedia for submitting their question. Here is the question: "Because nations have shrouded production of atomic and hydrogen bombs in great secrecy, would it not be extremely dangerous, despite the lofty ideal of world disarmament, for nations with democratic forms of government to accept the word of those with totalitarian regimes with regard to their strength in these devastating weapons?"

Mr. Murray: Mr. Johnson?

Mr. Johnson: It certainly would be extremely dangerous. It would be virtually equal to unilateral disarmament, which I think we all would agree would be a very dangerous thing. One cannot accept the word of people who live behind the curtain.

Mr. Mackay: I agree with Mr. Johnson and I give an example of people who are not behind the curtain. Anybody who knows anything about NATO knows quite well that the secrets of the military powers of NATO are not being distributed amongst one another. The Americans *may* give them to the British but they won't give them to anyone else if they give them to the British. And if the democratic countries can't do this, do you think it is going to be done between the democratic countries on the one hand and the totalitarian powers on the other? But friends, this raises the issue. The world is divided between the democratic

peoples and the totalitarian peoples, and that conflict must go on and will go on until resolved.

Mr. Murray: Senator Flanders.

Senator Flanders: I agree completely that disarmament must be an openly inspected process to which we are willing to subject ourselves. May I go back just a minute? We are all in agreement, and so the longer we continue, the less exciting our discussion will be. Just as an example of my belief that you don't have to

wait until all other problems are solved before you start the disarmament, nothing more hopeful has happened in the world in the last few weeks than the decision of the Belgian Government in the Congo, in effect, to turn Congo over to the natives of the region and to educate them as fast as possible for that purpose. The world does move, and it may leave the statesmen way behind it unless the statesmen catch up with the peoples of the world.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Senator Flanders. Well, gentlemen, it is now time for us to have the questions from our studio audience. And the lady on my left has a question for Senator Flanders.

Questioner: Senator Flanders, what can we do to create more interest in world disarmament at the community level, so that it will be a genuine concern to people who in turn will back you and the 33 Senators and 52 Representatives who propose resolution on world disarmament?

Senator Flanders: I will say in answer to this question that it is quite obvious that this meeting is one of those means. And it is quite obvious, I think, that if this meeting arouses wide interest that it will not be the only one on this subject, but there is also the question of getting the rest of the world interested. They are interested in many places in many ways, but that as I see it has got to be the result of an organized effort, particularly among the so-called neutral nations, and we must in some way convince them that we really mean what we say. Because the opinion is that this is just a

psychological effort in the world war, and I wish I knew just how to get that idea wiped off the slate.

Questioner: Well, I would like to add to that, Senator, that in a number of communities workshops are being developed, co-sponsored by church, farm, education, civic, and veteran's groups. We had one in Washington, as you know, with representatives of 55 bona fide organizations in the fields of science, religion, education, and labor, as well as farm, civic, and veterans' groups. These have increased interest in this question. I would also like to pay tribute to you, Senator. I just returned from Europe, and I discussed your resolution with people in various countries and I found that they were intensely interested to know that there are people in America both at the Congressional level, the top government level, and also in the community level who are interested in this question.

Mr. Murray: The next question is for Mr. Mackay.

Questioner: Mr. Mackay, do you believe that a commission prepared with plans for reconversion from

an armed economy to a consumer goods economy would provide evidence of United States sincerity abroad? This question has been sent in by the committee for world disarmament.

Mr. Mackay: The answer is *no* so far as I am concerned. The United States sincerity is not doubted abroad. Get that quite clearly. I have spent the whole of my life abroad, in a sense. I have been lucky enough to have spent a considerable part of it here, being educated as well, and it is quite a wrong idea to think that people overseas doubt the sincerity of the United States. Naturally, when a country is big and powerful, providing, as it does, half the production of the world, half the national income of the world, people look on their wealthy brother with a bit of suspicion, but there is no doubt of sincerity on this question.

The fact is that you've got to deal with power. The problem that worries me in 1953 in the United States is that they are discussing questions which we threw aside in 1924 in the League of Nations at Geneva, and that you are not past that period. That is a real worry. You haven't learned the mistakes, the wrong tactics, that we adopted in those years. We disarmed between 1920 and 1939 and we had the worst world war as a result of it. Hitler need never have come to power and need never have broken the peace in 1939, if only he had been stopped in 1935 or 36. But there was no country with the necessary power to do it, because we had always believed in disarmament. And no commission about resources is going to overcome *that* problem.

Questioner: Mr. Johnson, I would like to ask you the following question: Do you think that

there is any disarmament acceptable without efficient control?

Mr. Johnson: I certainly do not. It seems to me that effective safeguards are an absolute requisite to disarmament, and one of the things that frightens me at times is the fear that the United States may move, because of its desire to reduce its own forces, toward disarmament without effective safeguards from other places.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Mackay wants to comment.

Mr. Mackay: I want to come in only to say again, *do* face the fact that without some kind of overriding government there can be no effective control. There was no effective control between America and Britain, even in the war. We wouldn't allow the Americans to control certain of their troops in our own country, and we were friends and allies fighting, because we wouldn't give up our national sovereignty. And you did exactly the same in Australia and other parts of the world. And do you think when friends won't do it that enemies are going to do it?

Mr. Murray: Here is another question for Senator Flanders.

Questioner: Senator Flanders, I would like to ask, is the contention that the Soviet Union would like to see us arm ourselves into economic bankruptcy correct?

Senator Flanders: I don't see how we can believe anything else than that, because before his death, Mr. Stalin practically said it in so many words. The future which Mr. Mackay has set before us of expanding armament continuously like two game cocks trying to fly higher and higher above each other is a terrifying one and misses, I think, completely the possibilities of moral force, of moral strength, and in missing it condemns this

country, at least, to an effort which will ruin us economically. Now, we will keep our armament; we will strengthen it as we can. We will not ruin ourselves in the process, but we will primarily try to tap the reservoirs of moral strength, because there alone lies, to my mind, the end of the armament race.

Mr. Mackay: May I just make one comment on that? It is this, in the Convention at Philadelphia, when you created your own Constitution and when America was in a bad state, with marauders, and currency in a mess, and everything else, what did people ask Washington to do? To use his moral influence to come and prevent the situation and bring law and order, and what did Washington say? He said moral influence is of no value in this connection. This is a political problem, it is a matter of power. You must create in the United States an authority which can preserve law and order.

Mr. Johnson: And may I just say that to my mind this whole undertaking we are discussing involves the setting up of an armed force for the United Nations.

Mr. Mackay: If you will set up an armed force which can be controlled by an executive. You see, at the moment there is no armed force in the United Nations. All the Assembly can do is to pass a resolution, a call to action, recommending that certain things be done. In Abyssinia nothing was done. The people wouldn't act. In Korea, the United States did act, but the great majority of the United Nations didn't.

Mr. Murray: I have a gentleman with a question for Mr. Johnson.

Questioner: Mr. Johnson, is not prime precondition of disarmament proof that the Kremlin has renounced the central dogma of

international communism: namely, that even the existence of a single capitalist state in the world will not and cannot be tolerated?

Mr. Johnson: I don't think that that necessarily follows, sir. It seems to me that disarmament, a regulation of armaments, could be worked out with respect to certain political conditions which would make it possible to see to it that the Soviet Union didn't, in fact, pass its bombs.

Questioner: Mr. Mackay, do you think that the developing tendency toward regionalism and regional government in different areas in the world is a step toward greater or lesser aggregations and costs of disarmament?

Mr. Mackay: I think without any doubt it is definitely a contribution toward disarmament, because the more government you get over a wider area the more it is going to be possible to bring the different areas together and to get some kind of overriding authority which can create a police force which does involve disarmament.

Mr. Murray: I think we have time for one final question, Mr. Johnson.

Questioner: Mr. Johnson, there is more agreement, I think, than some people think in the United Nations on disarmament. I want to ask this question, whether in tackling this technical problem of safeguards that you spoke of, could not the opinion of the atomic scientists who believe that it may be possible to solve problems of inspection without adhering to international ownership and management be considered? Would that help?

Mr. Johnson: I think on that point it should be noted that Secretary Dulles said the other day that we were quite willing to con-

sider other proposals. But I would like to add this point, it seems to me that the problem of controls is not a technical problem; it is a political problem. It is a problem of what the states are willing to accept in the way of intervention and interference in their own affairs. One can work out a technical set of controls, but one still has the problems of getting that technical set of controls accepted within the governmental framework of a dictatorship, particularly.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your most informative discussion.

On behalf of Town Hall, we wish to express appreciation to Mr. William J. Gehron, Mrs. Virginia Levin, and to the other mem-

bers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for their fine co-operation in originating this program from the new International Center.

SORRY!

In The Town Meeting Bulletin of September 15, the last paragraph of copy was *deleted* in error. It reads as follows:

Mr. Back: On behalf of Town Hall, our appreciation to Mrs. Lucy Milligan, Radio and Television Chairman of the General Federation of Women's Clubs for suggesting this topic, and best wishes for the success of their nation-wide campaign for funds for the restoration of Independence Hall.

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

(Continued from page 2)

in 1938 where he remained until 1950, with time out for service with the Department of State.

Mr. Johnson was Acting Chief of the Department's Division of International Security Affairs from 1944-45, and for the next two years headed the Division. While there, he was a United States Advisor to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico. Actively working with the United Nations from its start, Mr. Johnson again played an advisory role at the San Francisco conference in 1945, at the First Session of the General Assembly as well as at meetings of the Security Council. In 1947 he was appointed a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Returning to Williams that same year, Joseph Johnson became a full Professor of History. His appointment as President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace came in July, 1950.

RONALD WILLIAM MACKAY—Former British Labor Member of Parliament; member of British delegation to Council of Europe. Ronald William Mackay was born in 1902, and was educated in Sidney, Australia. He received his Master's degree and Doctorate of Law from Sidney University, where he lectured classes in philosophy, history and economics. He practiced law in England in 1934, and became a candidate for Parliament. In 1945 Mr. Mackay was made a member of Parliament. His varying career has included the appointment to the British National Council of European Movements for which he held the vice-chairmanship. He was also a member of the British Group of European Parliamentary Union.

Mr. Mackay led the British delegation to the Union conference at Interlaken, Switzerland, (1948) and to the Hague Congress of Europe. Once again in February, 1949, he attended the first Congress on International Council of European Movement in Brussels. Reelected as a member of Parliament for Reading, England (1950), Mr. Mackay has lectured in England, Australia, and the United States. Recipient of various war time appointments, he was with the Ministry of Labor, and Aircraft Production. Author of, "Federal Europe" (1940), he has also written, "Peace Aim and the New Order" (1942), "You Can't Turn Back the Clock" (1948), and "Head in the Sands" (1950).

FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

Background Questions

DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

- Excessive armaments preceding World War I and the lack of adequate armament on the part of the Allies prior to World War II are both cited as indirect causes of war. Evaluate this seeming paradox.
- Are armaments the only or most important components of national power? How important are size of population, morale, industrial capacity, military potential as power factors?
- What effect would an immediate arms reduction agreement have on the relative power position of the signatories?
- Can agreement on disarmament precede agreements on all outstanding political problems—e.g. Korea, Germany, China, etc.?

DISARMAMENT—HOW?

- What are the basic assumptions underlying any attempt at disarmament?
 - Do all nations want peace above all else?
 - Are all nations willing to maintain the present power relationships?
 - Are all nations willing to relinquish enough of their sovereignty to make a disarmament program possible?
- Must disarmament be universal or can it be limited to a few nations?
- Must disarmament be complete and immediate to be effective? Or, can partial and gradual disarmament be achieved?
- What are the minimum safety requirements for an enforceable disarmament program?
 - necessity of reconciling disarmament with the sovereignty of the state
 - problems of inspection
 - control or abolition of private manufacture of armaments
 - danger in application of sanctions
 - problems of creating an international police force
 - difficulty of defending armaments and arriving at a proportional equality
 - problem of evolving peaceful methods of settling disputes as substitutes for war
 - opposition of some states to the acceptance of the status quo as permanent
 - need for the incorporation of the concept of peaceful change into an international order

ARMAMENT—WHEN?

How can we know when disarmament is feasible? What are the prerequisites?

Evaluate the differences between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. dis-

armament proposals with regard to timing? How important is the problem of timing?

DISARMAMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

1. Can either rearmament or disarmament be a substitute for a dynamic foreign policy?
 - a. Are the fears of our allies concerning constant U. S. pressure for increased rearmament justified?
 - b. Is military containment of Communism enough? Or, must we have a positive political program?
 - c. How can the West assume the peace offensive?
2. Evaluate Gov. Stevenson's recent suggestion that the U. S. "resume the initiative in re-exploring the possibility of disarmament" and his warning to the U. S. not to disarm unilaterally.
3. Is the contention that the Soviet Union would like to see us arm ourselves into economic bankruptcy correct?
4. Evaluate the concurrent resolution for guaranteed disarmament introduced by Senator Flanders.
 - a. Is its purpose solely to defend ourselves against charges of imperialism and warmongering? If not, what else was implied?
 - b. If so, has it succeeded in this purpose?

DISARMAMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Is there any immediate alternative to military strength in the world today? If so, how effective has the U. N. been in providing such an alternative?
2. Has the U. N. Disarmament Commission been more effective than the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments?
 - a. Does consideration of both atomic and conventional weapons as a single problem offer greater hope that a feasible program can be worked out?
 - b. What progress has been made thus far? What basic differences still exist between Soviet and Western proposals? Is further compromise possible?
3. Can we have international control of armaments without drastic intervention into the domestic affairs of individual nations?
4. Evaluate the contention that some form of world government is an absolute prerequisite to disarmament?

